NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 4 | Number 1

Article 5

1926

Restrictions on a Free Press
Robert H. Wettach

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Wettach, Restrictions on a Free Press, 4 N.C. L. Rev. 24 (1926).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol4/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

24

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

RESTRICTIONS ON A FREE PRESS*
ROBERT H. WETTACH
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

"The press, and particularly the newspaper press, stands by common consent first among the organs of opinion. The more completely
popular sovereignty prevails in a country, so much the more important is it that the organs of opinion should be adequate to its
expression."'
That the American press shall adequately express public opinion,
the United States Constitution provided that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 2
and the North Carolina Constitution provided that "The freedom of
the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore
ought never to be restrained, but every individual shall be held
responsible for the abuse of the same." 8 In commenting on this
section, the North Carolina Supreme Court said, "In its broadest
sense, 'freedom of the press' includes, not only exemption from
censorship, but security against laws enacted by the legislative depart-

ment of the government, or measures resorted to by either of the
other branches for the purpose of stifling just criticism or muzzling
public opinion."'4 This is worth keeping in mind in view of the
restrictions on the press which will be mentioned.
Mr. William Reynolds Vance, in the Minnesota Law Review, has
attempted to answer the question of how far the government may go
in restricting the freedom of discussion in order to protect the public
welfare. Such a difficult question will be without solution so far
as the present discussion is concerned, the purpose of which is just
to indicate certain things that exist as limitations on the freedom of
the press.
* This article was read, under the title of "Law and the Press," at a meeting of the Newspaper Institute in Chapel Hill, N. C., on January 14, 1926. The
Newspaper Institute was held under the auspices of the North Carolina Press
Association and the University Extension Division, Department of Journalism
and News Bureau.
' Bryce, American Commonwealth (New and Revised Ed.) 274-5.
'U. S. Const., 1st. Amendment.
'N. C. Const., Art. I, sec. 20.
"Cowan v. Fairbrother (1896) 118 N. C. 406, 418, 24 S. E. 212, 32 L. R.
A. 829.
"Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press,2 Minn. L. Rev. 239.
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For the purpose of avoiding confusion, Mr. Vance points out
two very simple propositions. In the first place, "these constitutional guaranties protect the citizen only from suffering legal consequences at the hands of the government authorities acting in the
alleged enforcement of law. They do not and cannot protect the
citizen against the social consequences of exercising his legal privilege of saying what he pleases." Thus a college professor who
should say to his class that all governments are bad and ought to
be abolished, or that the earth is flat, or that the University fails to
give its students the proper training, might well be within his constitutional rights, but he couldn't expect long to be within his classroom.
In the second place, the constitutional guaranties do "not create the
right of freedom of the press, but merely protect an existing right
from abridgment or interference." 6
Therefore it might be worth a few minutes to see what this right
was at the time the federal constitution was adopted or at the time
of the adoption of the first North Carolina Constitution in 1776. In
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, the following answer is given:
"We understand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not
only liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal censure
and punishment for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its
character, when tested by such standards as the law affords. For
these standards we must look to the common-law rules which were in
established, and in
force when the constitutional guaranties were
7
reference to which they have been adopted."
In a well known New York case,8 Vann J. said:
"The Constitution places no restraint upon the power of the legislature to punish the publication of matter which is injurious to
society according to the standard of the common law. It does not
deprive the State of the primary right of self preservation."
"There is a very general impression, even among lawyers, that
the right of free discussion is one of the fundamental rights of
Englishmen and somehow is part of the English Constitution. But
such is not the case." 9 There is no mention of it in the Petition of
Right (1628) or the Bill of Rights (1689). In fact, until comparatively recent times, the right of public discussion was'very nar'2 Minn. L. Rev. 241-2.
'Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 518.
'People v. Most, (1902) 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175, 58 L. R. A. 509.

*2 Minn. L. Rev. 243.
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rowly restricted. When the printing press was introduced into
England, it seems to have been taken for granted that the press
could only be used by license of the King. During the reign of
James I, the Star Chamber took over the regulation of the press, and
Parliament followed the Star Chamber in 1641 as the censor of all
publications. Thus the Englishman was not free to print without
previous license until the beginning of the eighteenth century. But
even after the Englishman was free to print just as he might speak,
he remained fully liable either in civil action or criminal prosecution
for any wrong committed in the exercise of his freedom. Truth was
not a defense until the passage of Fox's Libel Act in 1792. The
maxim was "The greater the truth, the greater the libel."
The colonists brought with them the prevailing English views as
to restrictions upon the freedom of public discussion. In 1671, Governor Berkeley of Virginia thanked God "there are no free schools
or printing; and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for
learning has brought disobedience and heresy and sects into the
world, and printing has divulged them, and libels against the best
government. God keep us from both." Printing was prohibited
except by license. The laws of Virginia were first published in 1682
and the unlicensed printer of these laws was arrested. But by 1776,
this had changed, and we find constitutional recognition of the right
of free speech and 'free press.iO
What was intended by these Constitutional provisions seems to
be that there should be no previous restraints upon publication, that
is, no form of censorship, but these provisions do not prevent the
subsequent punishment of such publications as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare.
Three restrictions on a free press which will be discussed briefly,
are, (1) the law of libel, (2) the law of contempt and (3) exclusion
from the second class mailing privilege.
I. A libel has been defined as "a malicious defamation, expressed
either in writing or printing, and tending either to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or the reputation of one who is alive
and expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule."" Libels
have been classified according to their objects: (1) libels which
" This brief historical statement is taken from a fuller account in Vance,
Freedom of ,peech and of the Press, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 239 and from Hale, Law
of -the Press, which is the leading text book on the subject.
'2 Bouvier Law Dictionary, p, 1951.
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impute to a person the commission of a crime; (2) libels which have
a tendency to injure him in his office, profession, calling or trade;
(3) libels which hold him up to scorn and ridicule and to feelings
of contempt or execration, impair him in the enjoyment of general
society and injure those imperfect rights of friendly intercourse and
mutual benevolence which man has with respect to man.12 Thus it
is a libel to charge a man with being a thief, to charge an attorney
with "sharp practise," 13 to charge a candidate for Congress with
being a "pettifogging shyster,"'14 to charge an official with graft, to
charge a woman with incontinency, etc. On the other hand, it would
not be a libel to charge a candidate for office with impoliteness and
lack of party principles 15 or to advertise some patent medicine or
beverage by printing a portrait of a person and saying that he personally used and recommended the same. 16 However this last situation has given rise to much discussion under the so-called right of
privacy. 17 The Georgia court has allowed the recovery of damages
in a similar case, but the majority of courts hold otherwise.18
In North Carolina, there are a number of statutes concerning the
law of libel. It is made a misdemeanor for any person to transmit
by any means whatever to any newspaper or periodical for publication therein, any false and libelous statement concerning any person
or corporation and thereby secure the publication of the same. 19 This
statute punishes criminally the person who communicates libelous
matter to newspapers, but that does not excuse the newspaper for
publishing such libels, and the newspaper is responsible in damages
for the injury done by the publication. Newspaper men are not so
apt to be prosecuted criminally for libel unless the publication at'

Newell, Slander and Libel, 67. See Paul v. Auction Co. (1921)

181 N. C.

1, 105 S. E. 881. Hoke J. in this case, at p. 4-5, said, "To constitute a libel it
is not necessary that the publication should impute the commission of crime,
infamous or otherwise, but the charge is established when a false publication is

made, holding one up to public hatred, obloquy, contempt, or ridicule; and
further, and without averment of special damages, such a charge may be sustained by a false publication calculated to injure one in his trade, business, or

profession by imputing to him fraud, indirect dealing or incapacity in reference
to the same."
4 Mees. and W. 446.
"Bailey v. Publishing Co., 40 Mich., 251.
" Duffy v. Evening Post Co., 109 App. Div. 471, 96 N. Y. Supp. 629.

"Peck v. Tribune Co. (1907) 154 Fed. 330, 83 C. C. A. 202.
",Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.

L. Rev. 193.
Pavesick v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co. (1905)

122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69

L. R. A. 101, and cases and references cited therein.
"N. C. Consolidated Statutes (hereafter abbreviated as C. S.) sec. 4229.

28

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

tempts to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman by words
which amount to a charge of incontinency, 20 or unless there is a
willfull derogatory statement about the financial condition of a
bank.2 1 These are specifically provided for by statute. In criminal
cases, the truth of the facts alleged is a good defense and entitles
22
the defendant to an acquittal.
When an action of libel is brought in this state for a publication
in a newspaper or periodical, the statute provides that the plaintiff
or prosecutor must serve notice in writing on the defendant at least
five days before instituting the action, specifying the article and the
statements alleged to be false and defamatory.23 The following
section provides:
"If it appears upon the trial that said article was published in
good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake of the facts,
and that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article were true, and that within ten days after the
service of said notice a full and fair correction, apology and retraction
was published in the same editions or corresponding issues of the
newspaper or periodical in which said article appeared, and in as
conspicuous place and type as was said original article, then the
plaintiff in such case, if a civil action, shall recover only actual damages, and if in a criminal proceedings, a verdict of guilty is rendered
on such a state of facts, the defendant shall be fined a penny and costs
and no more." 2 4
Such a statute as this, providing that if there is a proper retraction of the libelous publication, the plaintiff shall recover only actual
damages, has been held unconstitutional in Kansas and Michigan,
on the ground that actual damages were limited to direct pecuniary
loss, which would not compensate for the real injury, that is, the
injury to reputation. 25 But the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld our statute in Osborn v. Leach26 on the ground that "actual
damages" means compensatory damages and includes the following:
(1) pecuniary loss, direct and indirect, or special damages, (2) damages for physical pain and inconvenience, (3) damages for mental
C. S., sec. 4230.
SC. S., sec. 4231.
=C. S., sec. 4638.
' C. S., sec. 2429.
C. S., sec. 2430.
'Hanson v. Krehbiel (1904) 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041, 64 L. R. A. 790;
Park v. Free Press (1888) 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W. 731, 1 L. R. A. 599.
"Osborn v. Leach (1904) 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811, 66 L. R. A. 648.
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suffering and (4) damages for injury to reputation. Therefore all
that the statute did was to deprive the plaintiff of punitive or exemplary damages, and the plaintiff could still recover for all the real
harm to himself. The right to compensatory damages is a property
right and protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but there is no right to punitive damages, which are only
given as punishment to the wrongdoer. In case of retraction, as
provided by statute, there seems to be no place for punitive damages
anyhow.
Douglas, J., concurring in the result, expressed the opinion that
the statute discriminated in favor of newspaper editors as against
the ordinary citizen. He said, "If I write a letter libeling an editor,
that perhaps, at most, ten people may see, and he libels me by printing
identical charges againse me that ten thousand people may see, I am
subject to pains and penalties from which he is exempted by operation
of the statute . . . such discrimination cannot be sustained. 27
A statute also provides that in any case of libel, the defendant
may in his answer allege both the truth of the matter charged as
defamatory, and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount
of damages; and whether he prove the justification or not, he may
28
give in evidence the mitigating circumstances.
The proprietor of a newspaper is responsible for a libel therein,
although inserted without his knowledge, or even against his instructions. The ordinary rules of agency apply. It is thus well established that the publisher is civilly liable for all that appears in his
paper. Of course, the person who writes the libel is responsible,
both civilly and criminally. He cannot hide behind the publisher. 29
The liability of an editor for a libel inserted without his knowledge
has given rise to some trouble, but the courts are pretty well agreed
that if the editor is on duty, he would be liable just as the proprietor. 30
But if the editor is away on a trip or vacation, he is not liable for
a libel which a subordinate inserts during his absence and without
his knowledge. 3 ' Where the newspaper is published by a corporation, a suit is almost certain to be brought against the corporation
135 N. C. 628, 641.
C. S., sec. 542.
Hale, Law of the Press, 231.
Smith v. Utley (1896) 92 Wis. 133, 65 N. W. 744, 35 L. R A. 620.
Folwell v. Miller (1906) 145 Fed. 495, 75 C. C. A. 489, 10 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 332.

30

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

for the reason that the plaintiff usually sues the person with the
deepest pocket.
Reports of legislative, judicial and other public proceedings are
said to be conditionally privileged. But this must be a fair and true
report. Freedom of the press does not mean license. The privilege
arises because, as Mr. Justice Holmes has said in reference to judicial
proceedings, "It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place
under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen
with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest
moment that those who administer justice should always act under
the sense of public responsibility and that every citizen should be
able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a
public duty is performed." 3 2
Comment must be distinguished from reports of judicial proceedings, since comment is not privileged. 3 Moreover comment may be
contempt of court and this is the second limitation on a free press
which will be mentioned.
II. As to contempt of court, the North Carolina statute provides
that a person may be punished for contempt who is guilty of "the
publication of grossly inaccurate reports of the proceedings in any
court, about any trial, or other matter pending before said court,
made with intent to misrepresent or to bring into contempt the said
court; but no persons can be punished as for a contempt in publishing a true, full and fair report (not comment) of any trial, argument
'3 4
or proceeding had in court."
In 1895, Frank E. Robinson, Editor of the Asheville Citizen, published an editorial on the removal of a case from Buncombe to Henderson County, in which he criticized the action of the judge in
giving this change of venue. Part of the editorial follows:
"The reasons that Judge Ewart gave for the removal were
founded on an unintentional error, corrected by the context, which
the Citizen made in reporting the testimony of J. S. and the affidavits
of men stating that in their opinion J. S. could not obtain an impartial
trial in Buncombe. The error was corrected the next day, but if it
had gone uncorrected it could have misled no man who had sufficient
intelligence to read and comprehend the report of the testimony; the
mistake is too shallow and too flimsy to deserve the consideration
Judge Ewart seems to have given it."
Cowley v. Pulsifer (1884) 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318.
'Browon v. Providence Telegram Publishing Co. (1903) 25 R. I. 117, 54
Atl. 1061.
"C. S., sec. 978, sub. sec. 7 (italics and parenthesis by author).
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The court held that Mr. Robinson was not guilty of contempt of
court for the reason that the publication was not calculated to produce disrespect and contempt of court, neither was it grossly
83
inaccurate.
In 1914, there appeared in the Goldsboro Record an editorial
severely reflecting on the conduct of a judge, saying that he frequently fell asleep on the bench and woke up suddenly and played
hell, that he played set-back or pitch at night, and while playing took
a drink every ten minutes and got very drunk and that he was unfit
to be a Superior Court judge. This editorial appeared after court
had adjourned, but the judge cited the publishers for contempt. The
Supreme Court held that there could be no summary punishment for
contempt in such a case as this, since the publication had no reference
to a pending case or proceedings. Since the Court had adjourned,
the only redress left to the judge was the bringing of a personal
action of libel. 86
III. A third limitation on the constitutional guaranty of freedom
of the press is found in an increasing number of laws which attempt
to regulate conduct of various sorts and incidentally prohibit the publication of everything which the statute declares to be illegal. One
of the best known examples of such regulation is found in the lottery laws. In North Carolina, the statute provides that "if any one
advertise or publish an account of a lottery, whether within
,* .
or without this State, stating how, when or where the same is to be
or has been drawn, or what are the prizes therein or any of them,
or the price of a ticket or any share or interest therein, or where or
how it may be obtained, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 8 7y The
federal statute provides that "no newspaper or publication of any
kind containing any advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprize or
scheme of any kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part
upon lot or chance or containing any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by any such lottery, shall be deposited in the United States
mails or be delivered by any postmaster or letter carrier."38
Under these statutes, the publication of any advertisement or
account of a lottery not only subjects the publishers to a criminal
prosecution, but it makes the newspaper containing such an adverIn re Frank E: Robinson (1895) 117 N. C. 533, 23 S. E. 453.
"In re Charles A. Brown (1915) 168 N. C. 417, 84 S. E. 690.
C. S., sec. 4427.
U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) sec. 10383.
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tisement non-mailable. It may be worth our while to find out what
is included in the word "lottery." Judge Walker has defined a lottery as a "scheme for distribution of prizes, by lot or chance, by
which one, on paying money or giving any other thing of value
to another, obtains a token which entitles him to receive a larger
or smaller value or nothing, as some formula or chance may
determine." 8 9
Various trade extension campaigns, selling schemes, advertising
campaigns, etc., come within the scope of the lottery laws. Ten years
ago, our Supreme Court held the following arrangement to be in
violation of our lottery law. 40 The plaintiff agreed for a consideration to increase the defendant's business by twenty per cent. The
defendants furnished the names of one hundred fifty women who
were to be contestants for the prizes offered. The first sixty accepting were awarded a silver spoon. Each of the one hundred fifty
were given a coupon free to the value of ten dollars in regular coupons. The contestants were expected to drum up trade for the
defendants and coupons were issued by the defendants with each
sale,' the purchaser giving the coupons to his or her favorite contestant. Each week a piece of silver was given the contestant having
the largest number of coupons deposited. Each month a watch was
given and at the end of six months, when the trade extension campaign came to an end, a grand prize was given.
Chief Justice Clark dissented, saying, "The scheme presented by
this appeal is almost identical with the well-known method heretofore adopted by many newspapers of the State in order to increase
their circulation and without objection up to this time. The courts
have laid down the rule that to constitute a lottery there must be an
element of chance in winning a greater prize or winning nothing and
losing the purchase price of the chance; also that there must be a
consideration paid for the chance to participate in the distribution of
the prizes. Here there was no chance or fee for participating in the
contest. The contestant who works hardest and sends most business
to the defendant's store wins the prize. It is a question of hard
work, exercise of influence and possession of the largest degree of
41
skill and has nothing to do with chance."
But the majority of the court looked at the scheme as a way to
get something for nothing and a violation of the spirit of the lottery
"St. v. Lowe (1919) 178 N. C. 770, 772, 101 S. E. 385.
Brenard Mfg. Co. v. Benjamin and Sons (1916) 172 N. C.53, 89 S. E. 797.
' 172 N. C. 53, 57-8.
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statutes which aim to protect the public from designing persons. The
opinion of the court quoted Justice McKenna of the United States
Supreme Court as follows:
"Advertising is merely identification and description apprising of
quality and place. It has no other object than to draw attention to
the article to be sold and the acquisition of the article to be sold constitutes the only inducement to its purchase. The matter is simple,
single in purpose and motive; its consequences are well defined, there
being nothing ulterior; it is the practice of old and familiar transactions and has sufficied for their success. The schemes of complainants have no such directness and effect. They rely upon something
else than the article sold. They tempt by a promise of a value greater
than that article and apparently not represented in its price and hence
it may be thought that thus by an appeal to cupidity to lure to
improvidence. This may not be called in an exact sense a lottery
or gaming; it may, however, be considered as having the seduction
and evil of such." 42
Therefore if a newspaper carries advertising of a selling scheme,
advertising campaign or a trade extension campaign which violates
the lottery laws, it would be unable to recover the price of the advertising by a suit, besides rendering the publishers subject to criminal
prosecution and giving the Post Office Department a chance to exclude the paper from the mails.
Of a like nature are the statutes dealing with obscene literature
The North Carolina statute43 makes the publishing or selling of any
44
obscene literature a misdemeanor and the United States statute
declares that such matter is non-mailable. It has been sugegsted that
the test of immorality is whether the literature "has a tendency to
shock the moral sense of the average, normal head of a family." If
such a test would prevent the publication of writings of an educational value on sex hygiene, commercialized vice and the like, the
remedy would be a matter for the legislature, since the Constitution
only prevents restrictions upon, and not enlargement of, the right to
45
publish.
The Volstead Act 4" and its counterpart in North Carolina, the
Turlington Act, 47 make it unlawful to advertise in any way liquor or
"'Rast v. Van Detnan (1915) 240 U. S.342, 365.
"C. S., sec. 4348.
"U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) sec. 10381.
Schofield, 9 Soc. Publications 82. See Hale, Law of the Press, p. 293.
"'Act of Oct. 28, 1919 (known as the National Prohibition Act), 41 Stat.
305, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1923) sec. 10138r/.
"'N. C. Pub. Laws 1923, ch. 1.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

34

the manufacture, sale or furnishing of the same, or how it may be
obtained. 48 It also makes it unlawful to advertise any utensil, preparation, substance, formula, direction or recipes designed or intended
40
for use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor.
Then there is a statute in this State which makes it unlawful for
any person to publish any advertisement of any patent medicine or
remedy purporting to cure cancer, consumption, diabetes, paralysis,
Bright's disease, or any other disease for which no cure has been
found or any mechanical device for the treatment of disease when
the North Carolina Board of Health shall declare that such device
is without value in the treatment of disease. 0 This curious statute
puts too heavy a burden on the advertising manager, for who is to
say whether there is a cure for a disease or whether a device is of
value in the treatment of disease.
It is also made unlawful by the Securities Act of 1925 to circulate
or publish any newspaper in which an advertisement appears for the
purpose of inducing or securing any subscription to or sale of any
security, which is not exempted by the provisions of the Securities
Law or until the requirements of that Law have been fully complied
with. 5 ' The aim of this statute is to prevent the advertising of "blue
sky" stocks or bonds.
The statute as to fraudulent and deceptive advertising makes it
unlawful for any person, firm or corporation fo publish an advertisement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, 5ervice or any
other thing offered to the public, which advertisement contains any
assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, provided such advertising is done willfully and
with intent to mislead. 52 This statute seems to be aimed at the person who puts the advertisement in the paper and does not appear to
affect the paper, unless someone connected with the paper is a party
to the deception. The publication of such an advertisement in good
faith would be a valid excuse under the statute.
'U.

S. Comp. Stat. (1923) sec. 10138%2 hh; N. C. Pub. Laws 1923, ch. 1,

sec. 3.
" U. S. Comp. Stat. (1923) see. 10138% i; N. C. Pub. Laws 1923,,ch. 1,
sec. 4.
' C. S., sec. 6684.
"N. C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 190, sec. 7. See comment on the Securities
Act in 3 N. C. L. Rev. 150 (December, 1925) under discussion of recent
statutory changes in North Carolina.

" C. S., sec. 4290.
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In 1924, the legislature passed the following statute, which seems
to play directly into the hands of the Postmaster General should he
decide to exclude any publication from the mails:
"It shall be unlawful for any news agent, news dealer, bookseller,
or any other person, firm or corporation to offer for sale, sell or
cause to be circulated within the State any magazine, periodical or
other publication which is now or may hereafter be excluded from
the United States mails.
"This section shall not be construed to in any way conflict with
or abridge the freedom of the press and shall in no way affect any
publication which is permitted to be sent through the mails.

' 53

I can find no record of violations of any of these statutes by
newspapers in North Carolina, where the case has gone to the Supreme Court. Perhaps the newspapers keep within the law or perhaps these laws are of the unenforceable variety. But as they stand,
they constitute a considerable limitation on the freedom of our press.
Perhaps the most significant statute of this type in, recent years
was the Espionage Act,54 which not only provided for the punishment of acts which interfered with the operation of the military and
naval forces or obstructed recruiting or enlistment or the sale of
liberty bonds, but also provided for the punishment of any person
who, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print,
or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about
the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of
the United States, or the military or naval forces, or the flag, or the
uniform of the army or navy, or any language intended to bring the
above into contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute. 55 Another section of the act declared that any writing forbidden by the act was
non-mailable 56 and the use of the mails for transmitting such matter
57
is punishable criminally.
Whether the act ignores the right of citizens under a constitutional
and democratic government freely to discuss and criticize the form
of government, the laws and the conduct of those in authority is a
question which I cannot answer. It may suffice to say that a large
number of influential persons ascribed that effect to the sections of
'N. C. Pub. Laws (Extra Session, 1924) ch. 45.
"Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217, as amended by Act of May 16, 1918, ch.
75, sec. 1.
: 5U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) sec. 10212 c.
U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) sec. 10401 a, b.
U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) sec. 10401 c.
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the Espionage Act which have been subject to the greatest criticism,
and two justices of the United States Supreme Court are on record
to that effect.58
What we are more interested in is the power of the Postmaster
General to exclude publications from the second class mailing privilege. This power has never been given to the Postmaster General
specifically. But he has exercised such a power from time to time
until there is no longer any dispute about it. An interesting ease is
Smith v. Hitchcock59 (who was then Postmaster General) involving
the exclusion of certain dime novels, Work and Win and the Tip Top
Weekly, from the second class mailing privilege. This was done on
the ground that the weekly issues were not magazines but were books.
Each issue contained a story, complete in itself, but the same character is carried through the series. Notice some of the titles: Frank
Merriwell in Arizona, or the Mysteries of the Mine; Frank Merriwell's Friend, or Muriel the Moonshiner; FrankMerriwell's Double,
or Fighting for Life; Frank Merriwell in London, or the Grip of
Doom. The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Postmaster
General on the ground that the court would not interfere with the
decision of the Postmaster General unless they were clearly of opinion that he was wrong.
One of the first cases under the Espionage Act was that of the
Masses PublishingCompany v. Patten60 (Postmaster of New York),
who had advised the company that the August issue of The Masses
would be excluded from the mails. The company professed willingness to excerpt from the number any particular matter which was
objectionable, but received no reply, and then applied for an injunction which was granted by Judge Learned Hand in the Federal district court, 61 but his action was subsequently reversed, and the action
of the Postmaster in denying the second class privilege to The
Masses was upheld. While Judge Hand admitted that the decision
of the Postmaster General was final if there was any dispute of fact
upon which his decision may rest, yet the courts may review such a
decision if it is outside the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Postmaster. Judge Hand held that the statements and cartoons in
" Abrams v. U. S. (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 624, Holmes and Brandeis dissenting. See Chafee, Freedom of Speech, for excellent discussion of the Espionage
Act and other war-time legislation.
'Smith v. Hitchcock (1912) 226 U. S. 53.
'Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten (1917) 246 Fed. 24, reversing 244 Fed. 535.
'244 Fed. 535.

RESTRICTION ON A FREE PRESS
question were within the range of opinion and criticism, within the
scope of that right to criticise which is normally the privilege of the
individual in countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, in reversing Judge Hand, was clearly of opinion that the
defeat the
publication in question was intended to embarrass 6and
2
government in the successful prosecution of the war.
After Mr. Burleson suppressed the August number of The
Masses, he refused to admit the September or any future issues to
the second class privilege, even if absolutely free from objectionable
passages, on the ground that the magazine had skipped a number and
63
so was no longer a periodical, since not regularly issued.
64
The only case which went to the United States Supreme Court
involved a similar action of Postmaster Burleson in depriving of the
second class privilege Congressman Berger's Milwaukee Leader.
The order was made upon the charge that articles were constantly
appearing in the paper which violated the Espionage Act. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this section of the Espionage Act and upheld the administrative action of the Postmaster
General in revoking the second class mailing privilege. They held
that the decision of the Postmaster would not be disturbed unless
they were clearly of opinion that it was wrong-which, as Mr. Chafee
suggests, probably means never 65-and in this case they found substantial evidence to support the decision.
Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented, principally on the ground
that there was no authorization to the Postmaster to deny second
class privileges with regard to future numbers of a paper because
previous issues contained non-mailable matter. Justice Brandeis said:
"This case arose during the World War, but it presents no legal
question peculiar to war. It is important because what we decide may
determine in large measure whether in times of peace our press shall
be free. The denial to a newspaper of entry as second class mail
does not deny to the paper admission to the mail; it merely deprives
it of a very low postal rate. The scope of the Postmaster's alleged
authority is confessedly the same whether the reason for the nonmailable quality of the matter inserted in a newspaper is that it
violates the Espionage Act, or the copyright law, or that it is a part
of a scheme to defraud, or concerns lotteries, or is indecent or is in
"2246 Fed. 24.
62Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 107.
"Milwaukee tSocial Democrat Pub. Co. v. Burleson (1920) 255 U. S. 407.
"Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 107.
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any other respect matter which Congress has declared shall not be
admitted to the mails."66
In this case, the Milwaukee Leader built up a large circulation, of
which nine thousand copies were distributed daily through the second class mail. To deprive it of the second class privilege would
practically put it out of business, which is true of many newspapers
in this State today. While it is clear that the Postmaster has authority to exclude from the mails any individual issue of a newspaper
or periodical which contains non-mailable matter, it is doubtful
whether his authority should extend to the exclusion of future issues
of a paper for the sins of the past. There is no authority to exclude
a paper which contains no objectionable matter, and the future issues
may be completely unobjectionable.
But the majority of the court in the Milwaukee Leader case said
that government is a practical institution, adapted to the practical
conduct of public affairs. It would not be possible to maintain a
reader in every newspaper office in the country to approve in advance
of the issue before allowing it the privilege of the mails, and when a
paper has contained non-mailable matter for a considerable time, it
is reasonable to conclude that it will continue.
So while censorship seems to be prohibited under our constitutional guaranties of freedom of the press, yet indirectly we have
made the Postmaster General a virtual censor by putting in his hands
the power to exclude publications from the mails, on the ground
that they contain material which is non-mailable under some statute.
To take away from a newspaper or periodical, the second class mailing privilege, or the use of the mails altogether, is to take away the
only effective means of publication and put the paper out of business.
Such power as this should not be placed in the hands of any one
official, and, if there is a place for it in a democratic state, it should
be lodged in some impartial tribunal which would not be both judge
and prosecuting attorney. For new statutes will be passed, creating
other classes of non-mailable matter, perhaps in regard to evolution
or what not. We may wake up some day to find that our boasted
freedom of the press has given place to a form of censorship. Even
as they now stand, the restrictions on a free press are worth serious
consideration.

'Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson (1920) 255 U. S. 407, 417.

